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ABSTRACT
Recent rootkit-attack mitigation work neglected to address the integrity of the mitigation tool itself. 
Both detection and prevention arms of current rootkit-attack mitigation solutions can be given credit 
for the advancement of multiple methodologies for rootkit defense but if the defense system itself is 
compromised, how is the defense system to be trusted? Another deficiency not addressed is how platform 
integrity can be preserved without availability of current RIDS or RIPS solutions, which operate only 
upon the loading of the kernel i.e. without availability of a trusted boot environment. To address these 
deficiencies, we present our architecture for solving rootkit persistence – Rootkit Guard (RG). RG is a 
marriage between TrustedGRUB (providing trusted boot), IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) 
(serves as RIDS) and SELinux (serves as RIPS). TPM hardware is utilised to provide total integrity of 
our platform via storage of the aggregate of the clean snapshot of our platform OS kernel into TPM 
hardware registers (i.e. the PCR) – of which no software attacks have been demonstrated to date. RG 
solves rootkit persistence by leveraging on one vital but simple strategy: the mounting of rootkit defense 
via prevention of the execution of configuration binaries or build initialisation scripts. We adopted the 
technique of rootkit persistence prevention via thwarting the initialisation of a rootkit’s installation 
procedure; if the rootkit is successfully installed, proper deployment via thwarting of the rootkit’s 
configuration is prevented. We had subjected the RG to 8 real world Linux 2.6 rootkits and the RG was 
successful in solving rootkit persistence in all 8 evaluated rootkits. In terms of performance, the RG 
introduced a maximum of 11% overhead and an average of 4% overhead, hence permitting deployment 
in production environments. 
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INTRODUCTION
Recent research into rootkit-attack mitigation focusses upon two major categories: detection 
and prevention. Recent works from the first category includes Nguyen et al. (2007), Doug et 
al. (2007) and Riley et al. (2007).
Two collective traits are identified within the RIDS works. The first is that the method 
employed rests on the fact that detection is based on kernel integrity. Violation of kernel integrity 
signifies rootkit compromise. The second is that there exists no mechanism for the guarantee of 
platform integrity from the moment the terminal is booted until the kernel loads. With the RIDS 
codes or tool deployed and functioning at the kernel level, we can assert that vulnerabilities 
exist even from the moment the BIOS boot block code loads until the OS kernel becomes 
available. Overcoming this vulnerability requires a trusted boot process, where integrity can 
be preserved from the moment the BIOS code loads until the kernel loads. 
Realisation of the trusted boot is achievable via the availability of a boot-loader with 
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) support, which mandates the utilisation of hardware-based 
anchorage for a stage by stage integrity measurement, starting from the BIOS, boot-loader and 
finally the OS. In guaranteeing platform integrity, execution of the next stage is only permitted 
after the preceding stage has been guaranteed of its safety. Highly reliable integrity of RIDS 
solutions is attainable if existing RIDS solutions are complemented with TrustedGRUB (Ulrich 
Kühn, 2007). 
In the detection category, we discovered that no mechanism is available to provide a truly 
reliable guard (the detection codes or tool) i.e. if the integrity of the guard is compromised, 
how do we trust the guard any further and who can we trust after a compromise occurs? 
Furthermore, how can we ensure that the guard can never lie about its current state, even in 
the compromised state? 
The answer is of course to have a guard that can never be tampered with. We present the 
use of an IMA-based (Riener Sailer et al., 2004) RIDS (Integrity Measurement Architecture) 
with TPM hardware anchorage, which provides total reliability of the OS kernel via storage of 
digitally signed aggregate of the clean snapshot of the OS kernel into TPM hardware registers 
(i.e. PCRs), the theft of which is possible only with physical attacks mounted on the TPM chip. 
To date no theft or attacks have been found to be viable through software. The TPM PCR was 
able to anchor clean snapshots of the OS kernel, ensuring the availability of a truly reliable 
guard in the event of compromise.
Recent works in the second category include Secvisor by Arvind Seshadri et al. (2007), 
NICKLE by Riley et al. (2007), HookSafe by Zhi Wang et al. (2009) and IFEDAC by Ziqing 
Mao et al. (2011) . Secvisor employs enforcement of Write + Execute in memory pages of 
guest OS, barring non-authorized codes from being executed with kernel-level privileges. 
NICKLE employs memory shadowing technique utilising shadow physical memory in 
VMM (Virtual Machine Monitors) for performing authentication of kernel code in real-time 
execution, ensuring only trusted codes be permitted for execution , in turn ensuring freedom 
from rootkit codes. In Hooksafe, rootkit defense is mounted via protection of kernel hooks in 
guest OS of hypervisors from being hijacked via relocation of dedicated page-aligned memory, 
and hardware-based page-level protection is utilised for access regulation of kernel hooks. In 
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IFEDAC, the marriage of DAC and MAC is utilised for achieving the best of both worlds 
for the aim of the development of a malware-resistant DAC-MAC system, which guarantees 
security via permitting user-defined objects (e.g. files) in the OS to be trusted, and employing 
MAC policies for ensuring malware such as Trojan Horses fails to remain persistent in the 
event the malware is successful in its deployment.
Although advanced techniques such as memory shadowing (as per NICKLE) and kernel-
hook protection (as per HookSafe) were employed, the majority of rootkit-mitigation works 
neglected one simple but vital factor in rootkit defense i.e. rootkit defense can be mounted via 
prevention of the execution of configuration binaries or build initialisation scripts.
Taking this into consideration, we utilised SELinux (Richard Haines, 2010) MAC 
(Mandatory Access Control) mechanism where all files (objects) are assumed as a threat 
unless otherwise specified. The availability of the MAC configuration mechanism of SELinux, 
with its dynamic programming language like SELinux policies, enables the labelling of OS 
objects and files via file type enforcement labelling, which labels files into trusted and non-
trusted objects, granting rwx (read, write and execute) permissions to objects deemed trustable 
by the OS administrator. In order to preserve normal OS operations, policies were written 
for the trusted and permitted execution of binaries only in the /bin and /sbin directories. Our 
experiment with 8 real-world Linux kernel 2.6 rootkits demonstrates that all these 8 rookits 
require some form of configuration prior to deployment and for proper operation and that 
SELinux is effective and successful in the prevention of the execution of configuration binaries 
and build initialisation scripts. 
A collective trait of Secvisor, NICKLE and HookSafe, all rootkit defenses, was mounted 
in hypervisors (also known as Virtual Machine Monitors or VMM) using guest OS. We wish to 
point out that recent and the majority of rootkit prevention works are carried out in hypervised 
environments, hence, there is no benchmark to evaluate both the performance and effectiveness 
of the published rootkit-defense methodologies. IFEDAC, while deployed in real time, neglects 
to address the integrity of the guard itself, i.e. how does IFEDAC ensure that the DAC itself 
remains trustworthy in the event malware targets the DAC?
In an attempt to complement existing rootkit defenses, we present the RG (Rootkit Guard), 
an architecture of merged SELinux MAC (Mandatory Access Control), an IMA-based RIDS 
(Rootkit Intrusion Detection System), with TPM hardware-based anchorage and SELinux-based 
RIPS (Rootkit Intrusion Prevention System), deployed in real time. To ensure the integrity of 
our platform from boot-up until the kernel loads, whereupon SELinux would be available, we 
leverage such guarantee using TrustedGRUB. In short, RG possesses these features: ability 
to detect presence of rootkit, the ability to never lie about its compromised state and ability 
to prevent the manifestation of rootkits via the prevention of the execution of configuration 
binaries and build initialisation scripts. RG further provides an encrypted loopback partition 
for storage of vital data if a compromise is detected. The partition’s private key is stored in 
the TPM hardware register, hence, the impossibility of theft or software-mounted assaults.
Currently, to demonstrate the viability of the RG, we installed 8 real-world rootkits and 
attempted the prevention of the execution of both: i) the configuration binaries deemed essential 
for the proper deployment of the tested rootkits and ii) the build initialisations scripts (written in 
bash, perl). We demonstrated the successful thwarting of both via utilisation and enforcement 
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of SELinux MAC policies. In terms of performance, evaluation utilising the UnixBench 5.1.3 
micro-benchmarking tool introduced only a maximum of 11.3 % of system overhead and an 
average of 3.78 % of system overhead. The reasonable overhead has minimal impact on a 
running OS and, hence, we believe, practical, real-world deployment is feasible.
As at the time of writing of this paper, RG has been implemented in virtualised environments 
using the VirtualBox VMM (Virtual Machine Monitor). We shall, at a later stage, port our RG 
implementation to real-time execution .Our work (conducted in real time) provides the actual 
scenario of rootkit prevention operating in real time. In terms of deployment in robustness, we 
dare assert that our work supplements the clearest and most accurate results for the consideration 
of the adoption of our RG in production environments or in environments where the use of 
virtualised guest OS is neither possible nor practical.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: we present next the design of our RG, 
followed by details of implementation (under the section Materials and methods), proceeding 
to the evaluation of our RG in the section Results and discussion where we demonstrate the 
RG’s effectiveness in preventing rootkit configuration and performance benchmarking and, 
finally, end with the section Conclusion.
RG DESIGN GOALS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Design goals
The main design goal of RG was to merge TPM hardware-anchored RIDS i.e. IMA with the 
implementation of MAC-based Linux security i.e. SELinux for RIPS purposes with a trusted 
boot guaranteed by TrustedGRUB, the integrity of which is also guaranteed by the TPM 
hardware. We found that recent rootkit-defense work neglected to consider the importance 
of ensuring integrity from system boot until the deployment of rootkit defense mechanisms. 
The novelty of our work is that this is the first of its kind: we integrated TrustedGRUB, IMA 
and SELinux into a single entity, yielding a TPM hardware-anchored RIDS i.e. a RIPS rootkit 
defense mechanism with trusted boot feature. To summarise, we developed a rootkit-mitigation 
methodology or tool that can never lie about its state (feature provided by the TPM hardware), 
and for the effective implementation of rootkit-attack mitigation, permits only trusted objects 
to be granted security clearance (feature provided by SELinux). 
As mentioned in the introduction, recent efforts in overcoming rootkit persistence have 
yielded numerous solutions to the variety of methods to overcome rootkit persistence. Our 
work discovered that rootkits would fail to be persistent if its installation is thwarted or if it 
failed to be properly configured prior to deployment. Hence, another goal of our RG was to 
attempt the prevention of rootkits before they can even begin installation procedure, and if the 
rootkit has been successfully installed, to prevent its deployment via thwarting its configuration.
Assumptions
Our RG design and operation are based on these assumptions:
i. Rootkits may infiltrate, but will fail to accomplish proper deployment if their binary fails 
to execute for initialising the rootkit or for configuration purposes.
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ii. A platform may be compromised but it will reveal that it is in compromised state i.e. the 
platform never lies on the integrity of its state.
iii. The RG’s RIDS, although employing a commonly deployed method of comparison of 
healthy with altered hash values in the IMA, operates without the availability of intelligent 
heuristics algorithms. Hence, the RG serves to alert the OS administrator of a possible 
compromise and the user can then decide if the alert is one of false positive or vice versa.
iv. Our incorporation of SELinux as rootkit prevention mechanism with MAC implementation 
operates based on the presumption that all files are treated as malicious unless otherwise 
specified in the SELinux policies. Hence, rwx file permission privileges are granted only to 
files permitted by deployed SELinux policy, configured by the OS administrator.
v. RG serves to complement the multiple, existing rootkit-defense methodologies available, 
especially Secvisor, NICKLE and Hooksfe. No one single tool can claim 100% effectiveness 
in rootkit-attack mitigation. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We present the RG architecture (Fig.1) as the proposed solution to the malware threat as 
mentioned in the introduction. Our proposed solution is effective against solving binary rootkit 
persistence and any rootkit that operates via initialisation or configuration of a binary file, for 
example, to run the SuckIT rootkit, the rootkit will have to be configured and executed using 
./sk c command on the victim’s machine (Phrack Magazine, 2012). Lrk5 i.e. (Linux Rootkit 
Documentation, Lrk5, 2012) and Adore-ng i.e. (Linux Rootkit Documentation, Adore , 2012) 
are other examples of rootkits with deployment methods similar to SuckIT. 
Our RG comprises two major arms: Rootkit IDS (detection and alert) and Rootkit IPS 
(prevention). Effective implementation mandates our RG be compiled into the Linux kernel, 
hence, part of the Linux file-system. Availability of a TPM guarantees the integrity of a clean 
kernel state, as such state is utilised by RG IDS and serves as the essence of the RG’s reliability. 
The Rootkit IDS comprises:
i. IMA databases (clean and runtime) – protects kernel files and modules
ii. SELinux Policy database – protects user-defined critical files
iii. IMA database SHA1Comparison Engine
iv. IMA database Compromise Alert Mechanism
v. SELinux Security Policy Violation Alert Mechanism
while the Rootkit IPS encompasses the:
i. Encrypted Loopback Partition
ii. Deny File Access Features - to the infected file (via removal of rwx privileges)
SHA1 collision attacks occurring since 2004 (Bruce Schneier, 2005), Michael Szydlo, 
2005), Xiaoyun Wang et al., 2005) can be employed for the aim of defeating the SHA1 
digital finger-printing. In the event such attacks do occur, contamination only affects the 
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runtime database of hashes. The clean database remains reliable as the aggregate hash of the 
clean database is extended (i.e. using TPM_Extend) into the TPM hardware PCR (Platform 
Configuration Register) no. 10 as per the technique adopted in Integrity Measurement 
Architecture or IMA i.e. as per IMA Wikipage Main (2012). Should alterations occur to the 
aggregates, the occurrence would signify compromised integrity of the clean database. 
Operational-wise, two RG vital components are developed:
1. RG Module (Kernel Space)
Both the Rootkit IDS and IPS features are integrated into a kernel module called the RG Kernel 
Module, which loads simultaneously with kernel loading, i.e. initialising from init level 1. 
Such ensures detection of integrity violation at the earliest possible stage. We further include 
an option for the module to be built into the kernel.
Rootkit detection and prevention are simultaneously executed by the RG Module. It is, 
hence, imperative that the module interfaces to both the IMA and the SELinux Security Policy 
Violation Alert Mechanism. Fig.2 illustrates the arms and functions of the RG Module. A rootkit 
compromise alert is triggered via discrepancies in the IMA database and violations in SELinux 
Security Policies. The RG Module is protected from rootkits targetting it via the sealing of the 
SHA1 of the clean RG module into the TPM PCR.
Fig.1: RG architecture
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Fig.2: RG Kernel module components
2. RG Admin Center(User Space)
The RG is equipped with a control panel i.e. the RG Admin Center, a user-space application 
permitting users to configure RG, at pre- and post-deployment stages; this is detailed in the 
next section. The list of RG Admin Center features is given here:
i. Creation of a database of kernel files and modules (Build -DB)
ii. Digitally signing the database in i) above using a private-key created by GPG (Sign-DB)
iii. Creation of an Encrypted Loopback Partition for storage of user-defined critical files 
(e.g. missile launch codes) (Init-Partition)
iv. Seal the key in ii) above to the TPM PCR (Seal)
TPM-protected Encrypted Loopback Partition
The RG incorporates an encrypted loopback partition (i.e. part of Rootkit IPS) for storage 
of user-defined critical files e.g. nuclear warhead launch codes. Protection of this partition is 
provided by 1024-bit RSA Encryption, whose private key is stored in the TPM; hence, the 
impossibility of theft. 
IMPLEMENATION & TEST –BED
Implementation is conducted in two stages. See Fig.3:
a. Pre-Deployment Configurations: Essential set-ups and configurations necessary for the 
proper and effective operation of the RG
b. Actual, Real-Time Deployment of the RG: The RG in action, implemented in a production 
environment
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Unlike most malware research work which performs implementation in VM environments and 
deployment in guest OSes (Ryan Riley et. al., 2008; Arvind Seshadri et. al. ,2007), our RG 
was deployed in an actual platform with no hypervisors utilised. RG deployment was ported 
and executed on a Dell Latitute E5400 laptop, with the following specifications: 3 GHz Core 2 
Duo CPU, 4GB DDR-2 RAM, running Fedora Core Linux 16, with kernel 3.1.7. Currently, our 
implementation and test-bed is conducted on the same laptop as above, albeit in the VirtualBox 
Hypervisor (an open source hypervisor). We allocated 1.3 GB of RAM to the same Linux OS 
(installed as Guest OS in VirtualBox) running identical kernel. Each stage is detailed here:
a. Pre-Deployment Configurations
The pivotal part of the RG is the availability of a clean database of the IMA-measured SHA1 
list of kernel files and modules from a freshly configured platform .We term this the Clean IMA 
Database. RG Admin’s Build-DB feature is utilised for this purpose. Upon deployment, the 
clean database is compared to a runtime database of similar SHA1 list for rootkit detection.
Next, SELinux is utilised to establish security context for user-defined critical files via 
the writing of a dynamic programming language like SELinux policies (SELinux rules) . A 
critical files and objects domain is created and these critical files are labelled by SELinux with 
file type enforcement: rg_secured_t. Only files and also objects labelled with rg_secured_t are 
granted execution privileges. A database of clean SELinux policies for the critical files-objects 
is established. TrustedGRUB is configured to preserve the integrity of boot essential files (esp. 
initrd and vmlinuz). Finally, the creation of an Encrypted Loopback Partition for storage of 
critical files accomplishes this stage.
b. Actual, Real Time Deployment of the RG
This section considers the rootkit infiltration events after a SuckIT-type rootkit was successfully 
planted on the victim’s machine (V). Configuration of the SuckIT binary is essential prior to 
the execution of a backdoor to permit access to V machine by a remote attacker (A) machine.
Upon rootkit binary execution (i.e. ./sk c), two mechanisms in the Rootkit IDS kick in to 
alert the user: the IMA database’s SHA1 Comparison Engine (see Fig.2) via SHA1 anomalies 
in the clean and runtime databases, and the SELinux Policy Violation Alert Mechanism issues an 
alert on the user’s Desktop due to policy violation for two possible actions: either i) the rootkit 
attempts to access files in the critical files domain with rg_secured_t file type enforcement or 
ii) files not labeled rg_secured_t file-type enforcement attempt execution.
The Rootkit IPS steps in and unmounts the Encrypted Loopback Partition, preventing 
possible data theft (e.g. missile launch codes) by the rootkit. Instinctively, the detected rootkit 
is denied rwx privileges by SELinux as a decontamination measure. Fig.3 details real-time 
deployment in a procedural illustrative view.
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Fig.3: Deployment of the RG – procedural flow illustration
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Effectiveness
We subjected our RG to 8 real-world Linux 2.6 rootkits to gauge its effectiveness and attempted 
the prevention of both the execution of the configuration binaries and build scripts, both 
actions deemed essential for the proper deployment and installation of the tested rootkits. 
We demonstrated the successful thwarting of a rootkit binaries configuration via utilisation 
and enforcement of SELinux MAC policies enforcing rg_secured_t file type enforcement in 
our platform. The results are summarised in Table 1. The prevention of the execution of the 
configuration binary of one of the rootkits experimented on i.e. SUCKIT is shown in Figure 4.
TABLE 1 
RG Effectiveness in the Prevention of Real World Linux 2.6 Rootkits
Rootkit Pre-deployment means Prevention successful?
Kbeast-v1
Installation via build script execution
Yes
Medusa– 0.7.1
Sebek-3.2
Lrk5
Mood-nt
SuckIT
Execution of configuration binarySuperkit
Adore-ng
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Performance 
The Rootkit IDS: IMA integrity assessment via SHA1 Comparison Engine of all kernel files 
consumes 70s was measured using Bootchart (Bootchart, 2012). For the Rootkit IPS: we 
utilised UnixBench 5.1.3 for micro-benchmark evaluation of our RG. This tool is capable of 
providing a fine-grain performance impact of RG. The type and nature of tests performed are 
shown in Figure 5. Our results listed two highest overheads as the price of running our RG: 
11% - from Filecopy 4KB (buffer size 8000 maxblocks) test and 9% from the Dhrystone test. 
The average overall performance overhead for our RG wass 3.78 %.
The performance penalty is due to the operation of the RG kernel module executing security 
checks on the kernel files in the Linux file-system. The SHA1 Comparison Engine executes via 
comparing hashes of runtime kernel files with hashes in the clean database. This requires the 
use of string handling and comparison functions (which explains the Dhrystone test overhead) 
and procurement of hashes of all kernel files (which explains the Filecopy test overhead). Near 
negligible overheads are possible due to the power of contemporary user-computing platform 
hardware i.e. 4GB RAM and 7,200 rpm HDD plus 3GHz Core 2 Duo CPU. 
In terms of overhead, the performance of our RG was relatively on par with HookSafe, 
which reports a maximum overhead of 7% and an average overhead of 4%. Next, compared with 
another rootkit-attack mitigation model which is similar to our RG but without hardware-based 
anchorage for guaranteeing platform integrity i.e. the IFEDAC (Ziqing Mao et al., 2011), our 
RG showed better performance. The IFEDAC introduced an overhead of a maximum of 19% 
and an average of 5.4%. NICKLE rakes up a maximum of 13% of overhead and an average 
of 5.45%. All reported performance results were obtained using UnixBench.
CONCLUSION
This paper presents an architectural model i.e. Rootkit Guard (RG) for solving rootkit 
persistence. Our RG utilises the current trend in security solutions in the computing industry 
today, the TPM, in providing a complementing security solution with TPM-platform integrity 
guaranteed by the TPM hardware. RG incorporates Tripwire-like features and blends both IMA 
as the RIDS and SELinux security features as the RIPS in providing one weapon in the armory 
of tools/solutions against rootkit persistence. Our RG’s inclusion in the kernel ensures that 
RG is a limb of the platform; hence, RG is part of the platform’s ‘biological’ immune-defense 
system against rootkits. Evaluation of the RG, both in terms of effectiveness i.e. prevention 
of deployment of 8 real-world Linux 2.6 rootkits and performance i.e. with average overall 
performance overhead of only 3.78% underscores the fact that RG is viable for deployment 
in real-time due to its near-negligible consumption of system resources. The RG complements 
other existing rootkit-attack mitigation solutions in rootkit defense for OSs.
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Fig.4: Prevention of the SuckIT Configuration Binary, ./sk, from Execution
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Fig.5: Performance Evaluation Results of RG Using UnixBench 5.1.3
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